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Voi.. XVIII. MARCH, 1920 No. 5
THE DOCTRINE OF BAD FAITH IN THE LAW OF NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS
To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument
or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same,
the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual
knowledge 6f the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to
bad faith. Sec. 56, N. I. L.
T HIS rule is now enacted in all but two of the states of the
United States; the history of its development and of its ap-
plication since it became undisputed is well illustrative of the
process of the common law system, and this discussion is undertaken
for the purpose of discovering the general principles which a trial
court should have in mind when charging a jury in a case involving
the application of this doctrine.
The right of the bearer or indorsee of a commercial instru-
ment to sue in his own name was long in developing on the continent
of Europe' and its slow progress may be seen in England in the
seventeenth century in the writings of Malynes and Marius! Cases
become numerous in the reports in the last two decades of that cen-
tury in which rights of various parties to a negotiable instrument
are defined" The historical controversy over promissory notes in
which C. J.. Holt became so demonstrative was determined by the
statute of Anne," and yet his influence in the healthy development
1HoLDSWORTH, ORIGINS AND EARLY HISTORY OF NEG. INSTS., 31 L. Q. R.. IS and
elsewhere, and 32 L. 0. P-. 20: JENKS. EARLy HISTORY OF NEG. TNsTs., 9 L. 0. R.. 70.
3 At A. L. H.. so.
2 Lax MERCATORIA (622).
ADVICE CONCERNTNG BILLS OF EXCHANGE, (6s1 and r6s4).
'E. g., Sheldon v. Hentley, 2 Show., z61; Carter v. Downish. I Sa]k., 13o; Hodges
v. Steward, x Salk.. x2S; Williams v. Field, 3 Salk., 68; Hussey v. Jacob, x Comyns,
4; Hintan's Case. 2 Show.. 236: Anonvmous. I Salk.. 126.
13 AND i ANNE. CHAP. 9. SEC. 4. (I704).
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of negotiable instruments is noteworthy during more than two
decades.'
The development during this period was in the direction of
establishing the liability of the maker or acceptor to a remote party
and slight mention is found of the bona fides of the holder; in Hin-
hot's Case' the court held that the plaintiff must prove that he gave a
valuable consideration, for "if he came to be bearer by casualty or
knavery he shall not have the benefit of it." And in the Anonymous
case in i Salkeld' the transferee of a lost bill having taken a new one
in his own name, the court held that trover for the bill would not
lie against him because he had the bill in "the course of trade."
Holdsworth says' that the negotiability doctrine emerges in a num-
ber of cases? in the last few years of the seventeenth century,
"These cases go the length of holding that the holder of a bill is not
liable to be met by the defenses which would be valid against his
transferror." By 1721 the principle had been recognized' that the
burden was on the defendant to show that there was no consider-
ation.
Soon after Mansfield came to the bench it was held ' that one
who came into possession of a stolen bill for a "full and valuable
consideration in the usual 'courses and way of his business and
without any notice or knowledge of its being taken from the mail"
was entitled to payment; but payment was permitted to be with-
held "until inquiry can be made whether the bearer of the note came
fairly by it or no." Six years later' the question was submitted
to the jury "whether the holder came into possession fairly and
bona fide." J. Wilmot in that case speaks of the "greatest caution"
of the holder, not the least "imputation or pretence of suspicion"
that he had notice of the loss, and the holder should be held "strictly
to prove his coming by it bona fide." J. Yates also mentions those
matters as being important in the case.
Another case came before Mansfield in 17811" of a stolen bill
indorsed several times in blank, the holder declaring under the en-
dorsement of the payee. The defendant contended that a transferee
should insist upon knowing all the circumstances and the manner
a HOL's REPORTS. x688 to 1710. MODEmw REwoRTs and SALKELD.
12 Show.. 236 (1682).
51 Salk.. xa6-0698).
' 32 L. Q. R. 20, et seq.
10 Citing Hodges v. Steward, r Salk., x2S (1692); Hussey v. Jacob, r Comyns, 4
(1697); Lambert v. Pack, x Salk., 127 (1700); Hill v. Lewis, i Salk., 132 (1709).
U Brown v. Marsh. Gilb. Ea. Cas.
2C. J. MANSFIELn. 17.6 to r788: Miller v. Race, 1 Burrow. 452.
u Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burrow. zsx6 (1764).
34 Peacock v. Rhodes. 2 Doug.. 6ss.
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in which the bill had come to the inaorser, but Mansfield said--"The
question of nmla fides was for the consideration of the jury. The
circumstances that the buyer (of the goods) and also the drawers
were strangers to the plaintiff and that he took the bill for goods on
which he had a profit, were ground of suspicion very fit for their
consideration. But they have considered them and have found that
it was received in the course of trade, and therefore the case is clear
and within the principle of all those cited from that of Miller v.
Race downwards." The charge given to the jury is not stated and
apparently has never been available.
In i8oi" in a suit on a lost bill the defendant contended that "a
banker or any other should not discount a bill for a person without
using diligence to inquire into the circumstances as well respecting
the bill as of the person who offered to discount it," admitting that
"if there was any fraud in the transaction or if a bona fide consider-
ation had not been paid for the bill by the plaintiffs, to be sure they
could not recover"; but C. J. Kenyon said the rule proposed would
''paralyze the circulation of paper."
So stood the law when Gill v. Cubitt' came before the King's
Bench in 1824, on a lost bill bought from a stranger upon inquiry
only as to solvency of the acceptor. The court discredited Lawson
v. Weston and said it was accountable for much of the robbery of
mail stages during the preceding years since the thief was thereby
enabled to dispose of any bills very readily. The case turned on the
charge to the jury "whether he (the plaintiff) took it under cir-
cumstances which ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent
and careful man." J. Bayley sheds some gratifying light on the
practice of the courts when he says that in these cases (i. e., on lost
and stolen bills) up to the present one the question submitted to the
jury was-"whether the bill was taken bona fide and whether a
valuable consideration was given for it," and proceeds "I consider
it was part of the bona fides whether the plaintiff had asked all those
questions which, in the ordinary and proper manner in which trade
is conducted, a party ought to ask." He then quotes Mansfield in
the case of Peacock v. Rhodes and continues: (see note 14) then if
in that case those were questions fit for the consideration of the
jury as part and parcel of the-question of bona fides, is it not also a
fit and proper question for their consideration whether he has in-
quired with that degree of caution which, in the ordinary course of
trade a prudent trader ought to use? And the charge was upheld.
Now in all these cases of lost and stolen bills the court had
I Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp.. S6.
is 3 B. and C.. 466.
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said in 1758 that the plaintiff took the bill for a full and valuable
consideration and in the usual course of business; in 1764 that the
plaintiff took fairly and bona fide in the course of trade and even
with the greatest caution; in 1781 the court again speaks of taking 
in
the course of trade. Apparently "the course of trade" implied some
inquiry, exercise of caution, such as a prudent trader would 
use.
And in Gill v. Cubitt the course of trade is referred to as deter-
mining the rights of the holder; here for the first time do we find
a reported instance of the court attempting to give the jury a some-
what analytical statement of the law of bona fides and directing 
their
attention to suspicious circumstances proper to be considered 
in
determining bona fides. What charges were given to juries 
in the
cases during the period 1758 to 1824, and how the question of 
the
good or bad faith of the holder was to be determined we 
do not
know from the reports, except from the above mentioned allusion
by J. Bayley; we may, however, conclude that they did not descend
into detail in defining good faith or bad faith, since no mention 
of
such charge is made in the reports of the period or in any since 
or
in any discussion of this question. Hence the inference seems proper
that here the court was attempting such definition of the law as the
facts seemed to demand, and in doing so raised a new question, 
in
the- determination of which the earlier cases are of little authority
and the ultimate settlement of which would depend upon how the
freest circulation of negotiable paper could be secured consistent
with safety in commercial transactions.
During the next decade several cases follow this rule," but in
I834 the jury were instructed to find for the plaintiff if they
thought he had not been guilty of gross negligence in taking the bill
under the circumstances in evidence; the requested charge which
was denied in this case was: "* * * whether the circumstances
ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent man," in accord
with Gill v. Cubitt. In 1836' the court held that the case should not
go to the jury on the question of gross negligence, since that was
not a sufficient answer to an allegation of good faith and value; but
the proper rule was stated to be that where the bill has passed to
the plaintiff without any proof of bad faith in him there is no objec-
tion to his title. Three years later' it was held insufficient to charge
the plaintiff with inala fides by averring that he was not "the bona
' DoUm v. Hallitg, 4 B. and C., 330; Snow v. Peacock, 2 Car. and Payne. 
215;
Beckatuth v. Corral, 2 Car. and Payne, 261.
" Crook v. Jadi. ; B. and Ad.. 9o.
" Goodman v. Harvev, 4 Ad. and El.. 870.
" Uther v. Rich, to Ad. and EL. 784.
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fide holder of the bill", but the rule was announced that inula fides
must be distinctly alleged.
A little later" in a case of fraud on the drawer the plea alleged
knowledge and notice thereof in the plaintiff and the court construed
this defense to mean "not merely express notice, but knowledge or
the means of knowledge to which the party willfully shuts his eyes."
This summary view shows that by 1847 in England the doctrine
of "bad faith" as applicable to the holder plaintiff (or defendant in
some actions) had become thoroughly established, and it may be
expressed as follows :-Where extraneous circumstances are relied
upon to defeat the title of the holder of a bill or note the plea must
specifically allege bad faith in the holder; and bad faith is proven by
showing knowledge of the circumstances or means of knowledge to
which the holder willfully shuts his eyes. The trial courts were
busy in endeavoring to give definition to that doctrine in elaborat-
ing the instructions to the jury. The new doctrine elicited many
questions the answers to which would, in accordance with the uni-
versal experience under the common law system, give direction to
the movement of the doctrine among the many groups of facts to
which it must be applied.
The rule thus clearly established in England has not been ques-
tioned there since; and whether it is the rule prior to i8oo reaf-
* firmed, as most writers and courts have stated, or whether it is the
result of an effort to give sharper definition to the law as a result of
the widening use and importance of the negotiable instrument, as
concluded herein, is probably not so material; yet as a matter of
historical import the conclusion is worth uttering in order to get it
"into the record."
The doctrine will now be followed in the United States.
In KENT'S COMMENTARIES, Vol. 3, at pages 81 and 82 the rule
of "suspicious circumstances" is discussed, and several American
cases are cited in support thereof, and particular attention .is given
to Gill v. Cubitt and its effect on the earlier decision in Lawson v.
Weston. This work came nut in 1828.
Story wrote his "PROMISSORY NOTES" in 1845, and his "BILLS"
a few years earlier, summarizing much of the latter work relating to
the subject of bona fide holder in the former; the status of the doc-
trine of bad faith at that time he thus expresses. -"But the reason-
able doctrine now established is that nothing short of fraud, not even
gross negligence, if unattended with nala fides on the part of the
21 May v. Chapman, z6 M. and W.. 35 (1847).
" Sec. 38a.
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maker or otner party paying a note, will invalidate the payment so
as to take away the rights founded thereon." This is a strange
statement and it is not found that any other writer or any court has
attached this doctrine to the payer to disable him, and Story's mean-
ing here is not apparent. In an earlier section' he says that the
doctrine of suspicious circumstances or without due caution and
inquiry was overruled by Goodmn v. Harvay. In the same section
he expresses in a summary way what he regards as the substance
of the rules worked out in his "Bn.Ls", ' namely, "it will be sufficient
if the circumstances are of such a strong and pointed character as
necessarily to cast,a shade upon the transaction, and to put the
holder upon inquiry." Hence the outcome of Story's investigations
is to fasten the doctrine of bad faith upon the maker or other payer
of the inistrument, and the doctrine of "circumstances such as to
put the taker upon inquiry" upon the holder. If the latter ever was
the principle in force in the United States, and there is good author-
ity fpr thinking so. it was beginning to lose ground and was dis-
credited in 1857 by the United States Supreme Court."
The second edition of EDWARDS ON BILLS AND NOTES appeared
in 1863; and in it he lays down the doctrine of Goodman v. Simonds!
and finds early cases to support it."
PARSONS ON NOTES AND BILLS appeared in 1862 and in review-
ing the stages of the rule in England he says that Lord Tenterden's
doctrine of suspicious circumstances was widely adopted in the
United States but Lord Denman's doctrine of mala fides was adopted
as a substitute in many jurisdictions, and was affirmed by Goodman
v. Simonds," concluding that the mala fides doctrine is in general if
not universal use.'
Daniel" is in general accord with Parsons as to the stages of the
history of the rule and as to the weight of Goodman v. Simonds.
Let us now look at this case. It involved An accepted bill which
was forwarded to the drawer payee to be by him used for a certain
purpose; he misappropriated it for his own benefit by transferring
t Sec. 197.
MSecs. 415. 46, and 178 to 194 generally.
KENT'S COMMENTARIES, above, and PARsoN's, below.
2 Goodman v. Sirawnds. 2o How.. .43.
20 How., 343.
" TOp Paging, pp. 3oo and 3o2, and marginal paging, pp. 318 and 320, citing New
York and Mass. cases.
0.20 How., 343.
3 VoL. 1, pp. 258 to 2bo, and notes; VoL 2, pp. 266 to 28o and notes.
DANIEL ONr NEOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. ]6th. ed.1 Sees. 770 to 776a.
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to Goodman and Co.. one member of the firm being the plaintiff
therein. The following charge was given to the jury :-J
"If the jury find from the evidence in the case that
Wallace Sigerson (drawer) never had any interest in the
bill sued on nor in the proceeds thereof, nor any authority
to use the same for his own benefit, and did dispose of the
same for his own benefit to T. S. Goodman and Company
and the plaintiff (holder) was at the time one of said firm.
and when the bill was so transferred to said firm such
facts and circumstances were known to the said Goodman
(plaintiff) as caused him to suspect or that would haije
caused one of ordinary prudence to suspect that said Wal-
lace Sigerson had no interest in the bill, and no authority to
use the same for his own benefit, and by ordinary diligence
could have ascertained that said Wallace Sigerson had no
interest in said bill, and no authority to use the same for
his own benefit, they will find for the defendant."
Justice Clifford makes the most comprehensive review and statement
of the law that had appeared at that time and expresses four rules
for ascertaining the status of the holder :-
A.-If the facts noticed are on the instrument the question of
knowledge is one of law, i. e., depends upon the construction of
the instrument.
B.-If the facts relied upon to discredit the title of the holder
are outside of the instrument the question of knowledge is one of
fact.
C.-If actual knowledge (of the infirmity in the instrument
or defect in title) is not found from the facts in evidence the holder
recovers, unless "
D.--The holder took the instrument in bad faith; and willfully
shutting the eves to the means of knowledge which one knows are at
hand is plenary evidence of bad faith.
On this reasoning of course the exception to the instruction
was alowed.
This decision firmly fixes the rule of 'bad faith" in American
jurisprudence. and the reasons for approving the rule were never
more cogently expressed; the reasons for rejecting the rule of suspi-
cious circumstances have been foicefully stated elsewhere, also, both
in England and America. In 3 CAMPBELL'S LIVES, 31o, it is said
that this doctrine was untenable and inconsistent with the theory
of negotiable instruments, because no lest could be laid down to
determine the circumstances which ought to excite suspicion. In
I 2o HOW.. 343. It p. 344.
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Crook v. Jadis' the court said that "reasonable caution" in 
such
matters was hard to define and a dangerous question 
to leave to a
jury. A rather complete statement of the reasons 
for the "bad
faith" rule was made by C. J. Beasley' twelve years 
after Goodman
v. Simonds when, after tracing the rule historically, 
he says that the
doctrine of suspicious circumstances could not provide 
a judicial
standard by which such circumstances "could be measured 
before
submitting them to a jury, and it is precisely this want 
which the
modem rule supplies. When mala fides is the point of inquiry,
suspicious circumstances must be of a substantial character, 
and if
such circumstances do not appear the court can arrest the inquiry.
"Under the former practice circumstances of slight suspicion
would take the case to the jury; under the present rule the 
circum-
stances must be strong so that bad faith can be reasonably 
inferred.
Thus the subject has passed from the indefinite to the comparatively
definite; from the intangible to the comparatively tangible. From 
a
mere matter of fact the question to some extent has become a matter
of law.
"I cannot doubt that, when we recollect that inquiries of 
this
nature always attend that class of cases where judgments are 
sought
against innocent and unfortunate parties, the change is most 
bene-
ficial. All experience has shown how hard it is to prevent juries
from seizing on the slightest circumstance to avoid giving a verdict
against the maker of a note which has been obtained by fraud 
or
theft.
"To preserve the negotiability of commercial paper and guard
the interests of trade it is absolutely necessary that large power
should be placed in the judicial hand when the question arises as
to what facts are sufficient to defeat the claim of a holder of the
note or bill which has been taken before maturity and for which
value has been paid. It is only in this mode that the requisite
stability in transactions of this kind can be maintained.
"But I do not think the difference in the two rules above dis-
cussed is so great as some persons have supposed. In my appre-
hension the entire variance consists in the degree of proof which
the court will require in order to submit the inquiry to the jury.
"
223 B. and Ad., 9o9.
"Hamilton v. Vought, 34 N. J. L., T87 (1870).'
" It is thought that there is no general agreement with C. J. Beasley 
in this posi-
tion among the American Courts; in New York the court has directed 
a verdict where
there was no evidence of bad faith, even where the plaintiffs case was 
made from cross
examination of defendant's witness, Amer. Ex. NatL. Bank v. Tke IV. Y. &c. CO., 148
N. Y.. 698: Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Upton. 91 N. Y. SuPP.. 475. If nothing 
from which
a reasonable inference of bad faith can be drawn the verdict should be directed, 
Bank
v. Stackhouse, 9! S. C., 45S. Where there is some evidence of fraud it 
is proper to
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Mere carelessness in taking the paper will not, of itself, impair the
title so -acquired; but carelessness may be so gross that bad faith
may be inferred from it. Nor is it necessary, in order to defeat the
title of the holder, that he have actual knowledge of the facts and
circumstances constituting the fraud; it is sufficient if he have
knowledge that the paper is tainted with any fraud, although he
may be ignorant of the nature of it."
He then quotes from May v. Chapman," to the effect that knowl-
edge and notice mean not merely express notice but knowledge or
the means of knowledge to which the holder willfully shuts his
eyes." *
American courts generally"' do not follow the above rule as to
submitting the case to the jury, but send it to the jury unless evi-
dence is entirely lacking on one side, or there could be no doubt as to
what the evidence establishes. The latter is a rare case indeed,
since the matter of credibility is for the jury to determine as well as
the effect of the remainder after the incredible has been sifted out.
Although C. J. Beasley's discussion above has been the subject of
much favorable comment judicially, it is not seen that it has given
much aid to the judge in ruling on evidence or directing a verdict
or charging a jury. Nor is it seen that there is much aid given a
trial court in any of the above cases on the charge to the jury as to
the scope of the term "bad faith." There must be some general
submit the case to the jury, Bank v. Jordan, 139 Ia., 499. Although plaintiff's evidence
is not contradicted, all evidence sholId go to the jury, fo- the evidence of plaintiff may
nevertheless be discredited, McKnight v. Parsons, 136 Ia., 390; Bank v. Hoffman, 229
Pa. St., 429; Cits. Soav. Bank v. Houchens, 64 Wash., 275. And the Idaho court in First
Not. Bank v. Hall, 31 Idaho x67, after reviewing many cases in other states and in
Idaho, finds the rule to be ihat the question whether or not a transferee of a promissory
note is a bona-fide purchaser in due course is one for the jury, save in those instances
where the testimony is not only consistent with the good faith of such purchaser, but is
such that no fair-minded person could draw any other inference therefrom, and then
further qualifies the rule thus: "Where the good faith of a party who claims to he the
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument is an issue upon which he has the
burden of proof, the credibility of his testimony in support of .that issue, although
uncontradicted, is for the jury." (The burden falls upon the holder under the conditions
prescribed in N. I. L.. Sec. 59.)
A peremptory instruction is proper where there is no evidence contradicting plaintiff's
evidence of good faith, Bothwell v. Corun, 135 Ky., 766; and where shown that a
eorporation note made by an officer is being used by that officer for his own purposes,
Kenyon Co. v. Bank, 140 Ky., 133; and where a partnership indorsement appears as an
accommodation presumably and there was no i.lquiry, Bank v. Low, We7 Mass., 72.
These cases are exceptional in part, and the general rule is that the whole case
goes to the jury if on no other ground than that they are the judges of credibility as
well as weight.
"r6 M. and W., 355.
w This rule of course has no application where the defect or infirmity appears on
the instrument, as provided in the first branch of the rule of Sec. s6.
Ob See iote " above.
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principles determinative of the scope and conditions of application
of tiis term which a court may give to a jury mutatis mutandis with
the state of the evidence, and a liberal selection of cases will 
now be
noticed to ascertain how this doctrine is applied.
Since the able exposition of this doctrine in the United States
Supreme Court in 1857 it has made great headway in the 
states,
even before the adoption of the N. I. L., so that its application
appears in the decisions both before and since that code; 
states in
which the doctrine prevailed prior to the code would find no 
change
in the application thereof because of the code, and other states 
first
construing the rule as a statute would apply the usual principles 
of
statutory construction. The chief materials to be sought in this re-
view are the rulings on evidence and the instructions to juries, and
the reasoning of the reviewing courts on the exceptions thereto.
The courts in the cases now to be noticed have recognized two
situations bearing on the rights of a holder; one where some fact
apparent on the instrument is relied upon-such as a firm or com-
pany signature in a certain apparent relationship to the instrument,
or there is a recital, or a trust relationship is indicated; the other
where facts extraneous to the instrument are relied upon-such as
breach of faith, or fraudulent representations in the inception of
the inst-ument.7 In both of these Situations the courts have spoken
of the taker's being put upon inquiry and therefore held to know
any pertinent facts which such inquiry reasonably pursued would
have developed. They have also said that the person who is put
upon inquiry is the reasonably prudent man, and they have repeated,
and varied these assertions as fundamental conceptions with strik-
ing tenacity. In both types of cases the courts have also endeavored
to apply the "bad faith" doctrine.
Looking first at the case where the instrument on its face or
back contains a pertinent fact, the views of the courts are shown
by their own statements of the gist of the matter :-
Such fact puts the taker on inquiry, i. e., charges him with
notice of the facts such inquiry would develop ;" or, charges him
with knowledge of the facts ;' and in a commercial sense the taker
has acted in bad faith in taking the instrument ;" a person taking a
" See Gnndman v. Sitondf. 20 How.. 34..
T Buckley v. Lincoln Trust Co.. 13x N. Y. Supp., ioS; Gaston v. Campbell, 
X30 S.
W., 222 (Texas, xgio); Chicago &c. Co. v. Brigger, x96 Ills., 96.
URedfield v. Wells, 31 Ida., 415; Ae
w
man Y. Newman, 145 N. Y. Supp., 325, Fens.
terer v. Pressure Lighting Co., 149 N. Y. Supp., 49; $mith v. Weston, 158 N. Y., 194;
Bank v. Connolly, 88 Vt., 55.
19Rocheiter &c. Co. v. Paviour', 164 N. Y., 281; Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 N.
Y., 6x.
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note to the order of one as "guardian" is charged with notice of the
trust and bound to exercise a high degree of caution, and should
make a thorough inquiry ;' and an omission to inquire exhibits heed-
lessness or a purpose not to scrutinize ;' the transaction of purchase
by the holder is prima facie bad, bad until shown to be good, and no
question of good faith arises in such case';" it is also said that when
the marks of infirmity on the instrument would put an ordinarily
prudent person on inquiry, the indorsee takes the same subject to
the infirmity;" under such conditions the question of notice is one
of construction for the court ;" again, such marks carry notice to a
purchaser of possible want of power to make the instrument, and
are sufficient to put the taker on his guard-to put a discounting
bank upon inquiry and .t must bear the loss."
The rule which the courts are applying in these cases seems to
be that the taker is charged with knowledge of the situation, and
also that the taker is thereby put upon inquiry; apparently these
two statements are equivalents when applied to such cases. It has
indeed been held" that under Sec. 56 N. I. L. the indorsement by
the transferor in question as "trustee" is actual knowledge to the
taker of the relation which he bears to the paper. Hence there
seems to be no need for the two statements above and their con-
tinued use is misleading; the question of knowledge raised is one
of law to be answered by the construction placed upon the instru-
ment by the court, and therefore as a matter of law the taker should
be affected with the results of the situation whether he makes any
inquiry or not. Of course the actual situation that exists will be
shown by the evidence as usual. The rule governing a case where
the marks of the infirmity are found upon the instrument therefore
is that the taker legally knows the situation which is legally indi-
cated thereby. This notice is the "actual knowledge" of Sec. 6,
since for all purposes of determining his rights the holder's position
is the same as if he actually knew the conditions which are now
confronting him in evidence. As said in Massachusetts--
"Where the corporation note or other negotiable instrument is
payable to the creditor of the individual (officer executing it) the
transaction which on the face of the note or other instrument is
"Strong v. Strauss, 40 Oh. St., 87; Ford v. Brown, r14 Tenn., 477, 479.41 U. S. Exch. Bank v. Zimmerman, 113 N. Y. Supp., 33.
" Johnson Co. v. Longley Co., 207 Mass., 52.
" Jenkins v. Bank. 126 Pat.. 757 (Okla., x972).
" Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How., 343; Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S., 753. 758; Re Troy
and Cohoei Co., 136 Fed., 420.
a West St. L. Bank v. Shawnee Co. Bank. 9S U. S.. 5S7.
"Ford v. Brown, xi' Tenn.. A77.
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represented to have taken place is an appropriation of the corpora-
tion's money to the payment of the individual's debt and is bad un-
less shown to be good. Since the transaction is bad unless shown to
be good, and since the purchaser took with notice, his rights de-
pend upon the transaction's being or not being what it purports on
the face of the instrument to be, and no question of a purchase in
good faith can arise." But in a case where the transaction which on
the face of the instrument is represented to have taken place is a
legally proper transaction, and the "corporation proves that the ap-
plication of the note or other instrument was a wongful one, the
rights of the creditor depend upon his having 
acted in good faith.''
In the Tennessee case above cited" the court after a careful re-
view of many authorities"' holds that the indorsee has actual knowl-
edge, and the Texas and the Federal authorities are in accord.
'"
It is believed that the reasoning in these cases is applicable to all
cases in which the instrument contains upon itself the indications of
the defect or infirmity (see note 38), and many of the cases which
tenaciously lay down the rule as to the necessity of inquiry also con-
clude that the taker is chargeable with such facts as the inquiry
would disclose." .b Why, then, make a requirement as to inquiry?
If there was no defect or infirmity certainly an inquiry would not
be needed, for there would in fact be no defense of the kind under
discussion, and the only defense would be that no inquiry was made.
But that is no defense for it is abundantly settled that there is
no general duty to inquire." If there was a defect or infirmity the
situation is what is indicated by the instrument, and if this indica-
tion puts him on inquiry and if (per rule) he is bound by what such
inquiry can develop, then clearly he is bound whether he inquires or
not, the only difference being that if he had inquired he would not
have taken the instrument and hence the case would never have
arisen. Or if he had inquired and the situation had been misrep-
resented he has legally acquired "actual knowledge" upon which he
may safely act.
As to the case where an inquiry would not uncover the defect
or infirmity he will not in the suit be bound thereby if shown, be-
cause per assumption such defect or infirmity was not discoverable
at the time of the transfer.
4T Johnson Co. v. Langley Co., 207 Mass., 52.
43 Ford v. Brown, x74 Tenn.. 477.
a Ford v. Brown, 114 Tenn.. 467. at pages 47.5 to 481.
4 bForster v. Enid, 176 S. W. (Tex., 1915) 788; El Fresnel Co. v. Bank, 182 S. W.
(Tex.. zi6) 7o: Swift v. Smith, 1o2 U. S.. 442.
42,b Cohnfeld v. Tannenbaum, x76 N. Y., 126.
4n4 Goodman v. Simonds. 2o How.. 343. and many others noted above. Also Wilson
v. Metr. Co., 12o N. Y.. 14S. and Bank V. Lonney. 99 Tenn.. 278.
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It is appreciated that not all the cases support the above con-
clusions, but they are supported by ample authority, they express
a simple rule readily applied and relieve the deliberations of the
court of the confusing and ineffective terms "ordinarily prudent
man" and "putting on inquiry." These terms have a large place in
the law of ordinary contracts and form a guide in some equitable
situations, but they have no proper place in the contract of negoti-
able instrument where the infirmity or defect appears upon the
instrument itself."
The other case which is included under the term "actual knowl-
edge" of Sec. 56 is where the taker was given specific information
about the facts which constitute the infirmity or defect, and such
case obviously needs no discussion to show the disability of the
taker."
The next case to be considered is that where the infirmity in
the instrument or defect in title must be shown by extraneous facts,
such as fraud, undue influence, illegality or breach of faith, included
under the last branch of the rule of Sec. 56. Here there has been
much confusion and controversy, also. The evidence that must be
considered in this connection relates to the transaction by which
the instrument came to the hands of the holder, and has nothing
to do with the fact which constitutes the infirmity or defect. Of
course, where there is actually no infirmity or defect, the conduct
of the taker and his frame of mind at the time of the transfer to
him are inconsequential-in short there is no case, as set out above.
Hence, all our discussion must assume an infirmity or defect.
The Massachusetts court" sharply distinguishes this case from
the one discussed above, and regards the transaction by which the
holder came into possession of the instrument as good until it is
shown to be bad, and the showing is dependent upon the good faith
of the taker. The ultimate question in this type of cases is-When
does bad faith exist? and the penultimate question of course is-
What is bad faith? From a review of the cases a variety of state-
ments of a rule may be obtained, expressed as follows -
Bad faith is not shown by knowledge of facts or circumstances
sufficient to arouse suspicion in the mind of a person of ordinary
prudence who is guilty of negligence in not first following up such
information ;" knowledge of the infirmity is the test applied in one
-Fidelity Ca. v. Mars, 142 Ga.. 8zz: Bank v. Gleichmann, rso t ac.. 9o8 (Okla.);
Varis v. Birdsall, 162 Pac.. 9.z (Okla.. 1gx).
Jackson v. Jones. 94 Ark., 426.
lJohnson Co. v. Lanoley CO., 207 Mas.%. 52.
0 St. Joe Co. v. Bank, So Pac., ioss (Colo.)
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jurisdiction ;5' it is not shown by a failure to make such inquiries as
a person of ordinary prudence would about his Qwn business;" but
if the taker knew such facts as excited suspicion about the paper
such that he feared to make an inquiry lest it would disclose a de-
fence and consequently he shut his eyes and bought in the dark,
bad faith is shown;" willful neglect to pursue facts of which he has
knowledge is sufficient ;' or such gross carelessness as fairly tends
to the conclusion of bad faith ;" mere failure to make such inquiry
as might seem prudent to the jury, is not bad faith;" reasonable
cause and actual knowledge are not the same nor is the latter a test.
of bad faith;" the test of bad faith is'--"were the circumstances
under which the note was purchased such as to be prima facie in-
consistent with any other view than that there was something wrong
in the title to the note and therefore such as to give constructive
notice of the defenses thereto. In order to charge a purchaser with
notice it is not sufficient to charge him with notice or knowledge
of facts which would put an ordinarily prudent person on inquiry or
on his guard; he must have knowledge or notice of such facts that
his failure to make inquiry amounts to bad faith," and "in order to
charge an indorsee with constructive notice the facts must be such
as to impute-fraud or actual bad faith."'
The "suspicious circumstances" test in this connection receives
complete refutation as a working hypothesis in most of the cases,
but nowhere more felicitously expressed than in Missouri" and in
the United States Supreme Court in an early case!" and in Califor-
nia.'
In applying the test of bad faith some courts have felt called
upon to distinguish between knowledge of facts which results on
the one hand in suspicion and on the other in belief." This is some-
what metaphysical at first impression but it is illustrative of the
action of the legal mind in endeavoring to arrive at working form-
"4 Standard Co. v. Windham N. Bank, 71 Conn.. 668.
m Comstock v. Hannah, 76 Ills.. 530.
"IJowa N. Bank v. Carter, 144 Ia., 715; Walters v. Rock, zx5 N. W., 5z3 (N. Dak.)
5
Bank v. Shaffer, 147 N. W.. 85z (Iowa).
"Lee v. Whstney, 149 Mass.. 449.
"Clark v. Roberts, 2o6 Mass., 235.
"Park v. Winsor, iii Minn.. 2 6.
eol Bank v. Beecher. 133 Minn.. 81.
61 Hamilton v. Marks. 63 Mo.. 167. 177.
62Murrav v. Lardner. 2 Wall.. r1o. 121. 122.
4"Sinkler v. Siljean, 136 Cal., 356; Eames v. Crosier, i Cal.. 26o; Reilly v. Mc-
Kinnon, 159 Fed.. 78; Kavanagh v. Bank, 239 Ills., 404.
" Link v. Jackson, 164 Mo. App., x95; Bank v. Cape Girardeau Co., s55 S. W. (Mo.)
isii; Bank v. Borchers, 83 Neb., 53o; Doe v. N. W. Coal Co., 78 Fed., 62.
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ulae, and it is believed to be logical and to embody the proper test.
This is expressed as follows-.-
"Actual knowledge does not mean such knowledge as
would enable one to testify on the subject; but such
knowledge as would justify the jury in finding that plain-
tiff purchased the note in the belief, not merely on suspi-
cion, that the note was procured by fraud. If plaintiff had
such knowledge bearing on the fraud as to cause him to
believe that it was procured by fraud, then, so far as his
action in purchasing is concerned, he knew that the note
was procured by fraud.
"Knowledge of facts going no further than to arouse
suspicion is not sufficient; but when the impression made
upon the mind by such knowledge passes from suspicion
to belief, it then becomes knowledge.
"Knowledge of fraud is knowledge of such facts as
would cause a reasonably prudent man to believe in the
existence of fraud, and if such facts were brought home
to plaintiff, he would be chargeable with knowledge
whether he actually believed that the note was procured
by fraud or not. And if he actually believed in the exist-
ence of the fraud when purchasing the note it is imma-
terial how meager the facts may be which induced that
belief."
The distinction between the case where the discrediting facts
appear on the instrument and where they are extraneous appears
in some Oklahoma cases, and it is worth noting here as an aid to
understanding the latter case. In the Jenkins case (see note 44)
where a corporation note was being used for personal obligations
by the officer who made it, the court uses the phrase long acclimated
in equity proceedings about putting an ordinarily prudent man on
inquiry but at the same time holds the taker affected with all the
legal results of the actual situation; but in a line of cases where the
question of good faith is involved and hence extraneous facts deter-
mine rights of the taker," the court before and since the adoption
in that state of the N. I. L. have followed the bad faith doctrine.
Accordingly an instruction to the jury which would have passed
muster in the former kind of case there was repudiated in the
latter, although its applicability to equity situations and other kinds
of contracts in general was recognized. This holding is particularly
important because made in express view of Sec. 56.
6 Bank v. Pickard, 129 Pac., 38 (Okla.); Forbes v. Bank, 95 Pac., 785; Bank v.
Wade, I PaC., 205; Bank v. Landis, 132 PaC., zio%; McFherrin v. Tittle, 129 Pac., 721.
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It has also been laid down as the test7 that bad faith implies
guilty knowledge or willful ignorance (of extraneous facts); 
and
again it is said that bad faith is something more than failure 
to
inquire into paper because of rumors, or general reputation, 
as to
the bad character of the maker; also that willful ignorance is 
as bad
as guilty knowledge and both involve the result of bad faith.'
As further illustrative of the efforts of the courts to express 
a
fundamental test a group of cases in Idaho" is rather noteworthy,
because they were decided under the N. I. L. provisions, they 
in-
volve the defense of fraudulent representations and are directly 
on
the point, and they came before the Supreme Court in a short 
period
of time, thereby giving the most impressive opportunity to work 
out
general principles relating to bad faith that has come to any court
in this country.
In the Winter case the court approves the language in Gray v.
Boyle," namely, "The holder is not bound at his peril to be on the
alert for circumstances which might possibly excite the suspicion
of wary vigilance. He does not owe to the party
' who puts the
paper afloat the duty of active inquiry in order to avert the impu-
tation of bad faith. The rights of the holder are to be determined
by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by a specu-
lative issue as to his diligence or negligence. The holder's right can-
not be defeated without proof of actual notice of the defect in title
6r bad faih on his part evidenced by circumstances. Though he
may have been negligent in taking the paper and omitted precau-
tions which a prudent man would have taken, nevertheless, unless
he acted mala fide, his title, according to settled doctrines, will
prevail." The Idaho court cited the provisions of the N. I. L.,
quoted approvingly from other cases also in other states construing'
such provisions, and summarizes the rule to be followed thus:-
"We think it is only actual knowledge of the defect or infirmity,
or notice of such facts and circumstances as would put a man on
inquiry and would charge him with bad faith or the imputation of
dishonest dealing, that was intended by the statute to defeat a recov-
ery." This test is analyzed below.
"Hotchkiss v. N. Banks, 21 Wall., 354; Murray v. Lardner, a WaiL, I o.
e Goetz v. Bank, x 19 U. S., 55; Brent v. Simpson, 238 Fed., 285.
"'Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall., xo.
" Winter v. Nabs, ig Ida., is; Shellenberger v. Nourse, 2o Ida.. 323; 
Park v.
Johnson, 20 Ida., 548; Park v. Brandt, 2o Ida.. 66o: Vaughn v. 
Johnson. zo Ida.. 669;
Vaughan v. Brandt, ax Ida., 628; Southwest N. Bank v. Baker, 23 Ida., 428; 
Burdell
v. Nereson, 28 Ida., rz9; Southwest N. Bank v. Lindsley, 29 Ida., 
343; First N. Bank
v. Hall, 31 Ida., 167; Redfield v. Wells, 31 Ida., 415.
uEs Wash., 578.
"Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall., 10o, xa.
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In Park v. Johnson, involving the same kind of note, after a
statement of many facts in evidence, the court says at page 554 :-
"These facts were circumstances which the jury and the court
might consider and from them determine whether they were suffi-
cient to give notice to the plaintiff or to put him on his inquiry, that
the note possessed any infirmities which would in any way affect
its collection. If the circumstances surrounding the purchase of 
the
note were sufficient to give to an" ordinarily prudent man notice and
the plaintiff refrained from making inquiry with reference to the
transaction out of which the note originated, he is not in the posi-
tion of a holder in good faith without notice." And further, "The
existence of suspicious circumstances will not destroy the 
good
faith of a transaction, but it is such circumstances as 
would
charge the purchaser of a note, as an ordinarily prudent man, 
with
bad faith, or notice of the infirmity in the instrument, or 
defect
in the title of the person from whom he makes the purchase." 
Now,
when he is charged with notice, as stated, evidently for all 
legal
purposes he knows, and is therefore not acting with 
reference to
faith but knowledge; the court regarded bad faith and knowledge
of the infirmity or defect as equivalent, and charging the taker
means to hold him to the legal liabilities of knowledge. Here 
we
see no statement about putting one on inquiry and the test 
is all
the better for that omission.
In Park v. Brandt,
' involving the same kind of note, at page
667 the court finds the following language in a charge erroneous:
-"willful ignorance of facts is as much evidence of bad faith 
as
actual knowledge of the same," although the language had received
the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States.' To 
sus-
tain its disapproval, the court proceeds :-"What the plaintiff was
required to do was to exercise such care as an ordinarily prudent
man would do under like circumstances, but the mere willful 
ig-
norance of facts would not necessarily establish bad faith in the
purchaser * * * If the facts however- are such as would lead 
an
ordinarily prudent man to investigate, and an investigation is not
made, then such failure may be taken into consideration in deter-
mining whether the purchase was made in good faith or bad faith
* * *," holding that such a charge invades the province of 
the jury
in determining the weight of the evidence. The court seems to
overlook the force of the word "willful" in this statement, and the
test lacks the logic and directness of the preceding case.
"4 See note 58.
n Murray v. Lardner and Hotchkiss v. Bank, above,
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In Vaughn v. Johnson" at page 676 the court again criticizes the
language noted in the preceding paragraph and says:-
"He is only chargeable with facts which actually come to his
knowledge. These facts may be actual knowledge of a defect in
the title, want of consideration or such facts as would constitute
a defense to the note as between the maker and the. original payee;
or actual knowledge of such facts and circumstances as would
lead an honest and fair business man to make further inquiry, and
which inquiry if made would lead to the discovery df the fraud,
defect and defenses. In other words, it must be such actual knowl-"
edge of the defenses or such actual knowledge of facts and circum-
stances that a failure to make further inquiry would charge a reas-
onably prudent business man with bad faith and dishonest motives."
How this differs from the willful ignorance criticized above is not
shown by the court.
Some other cases before this court involve this question but de-
velop no new or different views, and it is interesting to turn to the
last case of the same general type7 and note the reaction of the
court eight years after the first case noted above, keeping in mind
that this court said in an intervening case that it had gone to the
very limit. ' In this last case the court reaffirms the rule laid down
in the first one. The net result of the attempts of the court in
these cases to give clear statement and definition to the law is a
rule in which the knowledge of the taker must work two effects,
namely, to put upon inquiry and to charge with bad faith, and the
equivalent of bad faith is said to be dishonest dealing. The statu-
tory rule requires only bad faith, and assuredly a trial court is not
helped by an explanation of the statute which requires a jury to
find two facts instead of one, the finding of neither being perceiv-
ably helpful in ascertaining the other. In the language of a fa-
mous baseball player, such rulings do not illuminate, they obfus-
cate, and the mutiplicity of cases appearing in an unbroken line in
the reviewing courts is eloquent of the results of these and many
other similarly murky opinions.
In further illustration of the difficulties involved in charging a
jury in such cases the language of the court in a federal case is
sigtiificant," at page 530:-
"If the purchaser of the note has actual knowledge of the in-
firmity * * * that ends the case. If he has no such actual knowledge,
then bad faith or a willful disregard of known facts showing the
" See note 68.
7 First Natl. Bank v. Hall, 31 Ida., 167.
"A Burdel v. Nereson, 28 Ida.. 129, 736.
"Re Hopper-Morgan Co., 156 Fed., 525.
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infirmity or want of title or a willful evasion of knowledge of the
facts will be sufficient to defeat recovery. Facts sufficient to cre-
ate a suspicion of the truth are not sufficient to show knowledge
or bad faith, nor is mere gross negligence in making inquiry or in
failing to make inquiry, alone sufficient. There must be either
actual knowledge or bad faith.
"Bad faith may be shown by a willful disregard of and refusal
to learn the facts when available and at hand. [Copious citation
of federal authorities, from Goodnian v. Simonds down.] A per-
son about to take a negotiable instrument can not willfully shut
his eyes to information or means of information or knowledge
which he knows are at hand. He cannot willfully evade knowl-
edge which he knows or has reasonable cause to think, would show
a defect in the note of want of title. He must act in good faith,
not in bad faith. Circumstances may be such as to impose an
active duty of inquiry and investigation and if such duty is not
performed it may be conclusive evidence of bad faith; that 
is, the
law may charge the party with knowledge which was at hand,
available, and to which he shut his eyes; that is, he might have
known the truth, ought to have known the truth, had good reason
to suspect the truth, and did, but willfully refused to become fully
acquainted with it."
The gist of the court's struggle to phrase this rule in its simplest
terms is that when one is put upon inquiry he is charged with
knowledge of what was to be ascertained; hence, legally, is he not
in the same situation whether he inquires or not? The crucial
matter in such statements of the law is-When is he put upon in-
quiry? The answer heard is-When it would be bad faith not to
inquire; but since bad faith is the ultimate thing to be found in
such cases this reasoning has taken us in a circle, and certainly
some other definition must be made.
A few more crisp statements of the courts in attempting to
clear up this field of the law may be noticed here :--bad faith does
not involve a furtive motive;
"' where the maker of a note told an
intending purchaser that there was fraud in its inception, although
the nature of the fraud was not stated the buyer takes at his peril
subject to the proof of the fraud;' proof of failure to exercise
reasonable diligence and caution and proof of circumstances which
would have caused a reasonably prudent man to inquire about the
instrument, and proof of negligence in not pursuing inquiries, do
not any or all of them, establish bad faith ;" it is incorrect to charge
Is Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 N. Y., 6z.
80 Jackson v. Jones, 94 Ark., 426.
" Comstock v. Hannah, 76 Ills., 53o.
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that proof of knowledge of facts sufficient to put the purchaser on
inquiry would support a finding of bad faith ;" if the purchaser had
such knowledge bearing on the fraud as to cause him to believe
that it was procured by fraud, then, so far as his action in purchas-
ing is concerned, he knew that the note was procured by fraud.
It will be noted from this glance at the cases that the most
frequently suggested test of bad faith is that the taker must have
knowledge of such facts and circumstances as to put one upon in-
quiry. The wide currency of this test is doubtless due to its long
standing usc in the field of ordinary contracts; in that field how-
ever bad faith is not a necessary element to be considered in deter-
mining rights of parties where a contract has been transferred. But
under the last branch of the rule in Sec. 56 under consideration, bad
faith is the sole criterion, and it is difficult to see that the rule is
explained by the matter of whether one is put upon inquiry or not.
Suppose the inquiry could discover no infirmity; is he still acting
in bad faith in failing to pursue it? Clearly not. Or, suppose that
infirmity would be discovered by inquiry and the inquiry is made;
the instrument would hardly be bought, or if bought it would cer-
tainly be subject to the infirmity. Or, suppose there is infirmity,
and the inquiry is not made, and the instrument is bought; is he
then acting in bad faith? If his failure was due to indolence or
carelessness or even gross negligence, there is no had faith. It
seems that he must have a high degree of knowledge by all the
authorities before he is put upon inquiry and just at that point
they apply the rule that he is charged with whatever an inquiry
would show, therefore it seems simpler and more logical to omit
the matter of inquiry from this rule.
As suggested above the only case ii which this becomes a
serious question is where there is an infirmity or defect, the facts
or circumstances which suggest or indicate it are known to the taker,
an inquiry would uncover the infirmity or defect but it is not made
-is the failure to inquire bad faith? Is the knowledge he has the
disabling factor, or the failure to attempt to acquire more? Buy-
ing with the knowledge he has shows his intention to act entirely
regardless of the rights of the maker and so is a piece of dishonest
dealing. The buying is dishonest, not the failure to inquire; if he
had inquired he would not have bought (at least it is not conceiv-
able); it is the purchase that now makes him antagonistic to the
defendant, and he will stand or fall upon the morality of his act
in buying-its regard or disregard for the other's rights-his hon-
esty or dishonesty.
"4Shaffer v. Bank. 147 N. W.. 8qx (Iowa. 1gx4).
B5Link v. Jackson, z64 Mo. App., i95; Bank v. Borchers, 83 Nebr., 530.
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If there is any duty to inquire, logically it would attach upon
suspicious circumstances known, while the duty to refrain from
taking an unconscionable Advantage is positive and attaches im-
mediately upon learning of facts or circumstances which create the
belief of fraud or the like, and he must be conclusively presumed
to have the belief when his action in purchasing would be dishonest.
It is not a matter of diligence or negligence* in ascertaining further
facts after enough facts or indications of circumstances are known
to induce the belief that there is fraud; purchasing 'then shows a
moral disregard for the right of the maker and is classed as the
exercise of bad faith or dishonesty in dealing which should disable
him from fastening any liability upon the maker by a transaction
which must be featured by good faith to be maintainable. The use
of the term "bad faith" gives a moral turn to the investigation
which will support the preceding conclusions; it is not believed that
the test applied in New Yorkb of bad faith'in a "commercial
sense" has been elsewhere adopted.
A virile charge where bad faith must be established will em-
phasize knowledge of facts which creates belief in the existence
of the fraud and the like; looking at the evidence the jury should
inquire-What did he know when he bought the instrument? If
he did not know the specific facts of the defense did he know so
much that his conduct in buying a claim against the maker was in
disregard of the latter's rights? Did he nevertheless buy when he
knew facts which inevitably led to the inference of fraud and the
like? The jury must sound its own sense of morality and deter-
mine the honesty or dishonesty of the taker." Although the widely
varying circumstances in evidence in such cases call for diversified
instructions, yet the simple question to be answered in them all is-
Did he take in bad faith? And it is submitted that we are not
brought nearer to an answer by considering the matters of being
put upon inquiry ad the reasonably prudent man, which phrases
have been great malefactors in befogging the law.
The following conclusions ensue from the foregoing, and sum-
marize the discussion:-
i.-The first branch of the rule of Sec. 56 N. I. L. has not
been the subject of controversy as to its merits.
a.-In making application thereof, cases where the defect
or infirmity appears upon the instrument should be placed
hereunder for the taker is held to have actual knowledge of
"I Gray v. Boyle. ,q Wash.. S78.
m Rochestcr &c. Co. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y., 281.
O
T
Bank v. Borchers, 83 Nebr., 530; Murray v. LardnCr, 2 Wall., n1o, 
122; Winters v.
Nobs, ig Ida.. 18. 26; Vauqhan v. Johnson, 20 Ida., 669. 676.
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whatever appears in the writing and must be held- to its legal
implications; the faith of the taker is not a factor.
2.-The second branch of the rule has been the subject of much
controversy.
a.-This controversy in England came on in 1824 in an
effort, not to change the law, but to give it more precise defi-
nition by applying the "suspicious circumstances" rule.
b.-By 1836 the controversy in England was determined by
laying down the rule essentially as stated in the above Sec. 56.
c.-In the United States the "suspicious circumstances"
rule was chiefly favored by the states until 1857, when the
United States Supreme Court announced the rule of this Sec.
56. Thereafter the tendency in the states was towards this rule.
d.-In applying this branch of the rule the effort has been
to give clearer definition to its scope; but much confusion has
resulted from the application of the rule relating to putting
one upon inquiry prevailing in the law of general contracts.
e.-Where one is put upon inquiry three situations must
be regarded:-
(i)-Where there is no infirmity or defect; here
certainly the taker's rights are exactly the same whether
inquiry is made or not.
(2)-Where there is an infirmity or defect-
A-If the inquiry is made the infirmity is dis-
covered and the taker then has actual knowledge and
the first branch of the rule applies.
B-Hence the only case of interest is where the
inquiry is not made; the state of the taker's mind
should determine his rights. If the facts known to
him are sufficient to create the belief or the unavo;d-
able inference that an infirmity exists, his Luying is
dishonest dealing towards defendant. It is not the
failure to inquire but the dishonest purchase which
establishes the bad faith. It is agreed by those courts
that insist upon the rule that the taker is "put upon
inquiry" that the taker is charged with the facts dis-
coverable by an inquiry; if so then clearly the taker's
legal situation is the same with or without the inquiry.
f.--"Putting an ordinarily prudent man upon his inquiry"
as a rule for the determination of the taker's rights is open to
the same type of objections as drove out the rule of "suspicious
circumstances."
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g.-The charge to the jury should embody at least an in-
struction to ascertain what facts or circumstances bearing on
the infirmity or defect are shown by the evidence to have been
known to the taker at the time, and whether they created the
belief or the unavoidable inference that the defect or infirmity
existed; if so, it was dishonest to purchase this negotiable claim
against the defendant and the plaintiff will fail because of his
bad faith.
GEORGE W. RIGHTMIRE.
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